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Metaphor and Philosophy: an 
Encounter with Derrida 
MICHAEL MORRIS 
Here is a caricature of how things might stand between Literature 
and Philosophy departments who did not get on well with each 
other. The Philosophers think that the members of the Literature 
department dabble in philosophy, but without taking it seriously: 
without pursuing the consequences of their commitments, or being 
properly concerned to ensure that their views are even consistent. 
The members of the Literature department, on the other hand, 
find the seriousness of the Philosophers almost comic: the 
Philosophers seem to be unaware of the susceptibility of their own 
work to a literary analysis which inevitably deflates its pretensions. 
In such a dispute, the name of Derrida might well be mentioned: 
by the Philosophers, as the epitome of literary-theoretical flippancy 
about serious issues; and by the more theoretically-minded mem- 
bers of the Literature department, as someone who has exposed 
the muddles and contradictions within the whole enterprise of 
philosophy. 
Derrida's famous paper, 'White Mythology',1 challenges each 
such department's conception of the other, and also presents a 
philosophical problem. Derrida claims that an attempt to debunk 
philosophy in general, on the grounds that philosophy is no more 
than a collection of worn-out metaphors (a 'white [or anaemic] 
mythology'), must fail, because the concept of metaphor presup- 
poses the very philosophy which is under attack. Conversely, phi- 
losophy itself presupposes the concept of metaphor, but-and here 
is the problem for philosophy-it cannot really accommodate the 
concept of metaphor. This problem is not, of course, just a problem 
for philosophy: it is a problem for anyone who uses the concept of 
metaphor, if the concept of metaphor really does presuppose 
philosophy. 
I shall try, in a cautious and serious philosophical way, to make 
out a case for Derrida's challenge, and suggest a way of responding 
to it. 
' J. Derrida, 'White Mythology', in his Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. 
Bass (Brighton: Harvester, 1982), pp. 207-71. 
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I shall concentrate on three claims which can be found in Derrida's 
paper: 
(D1) The concept of metaphor presupposes philosophy; 
(D2) Philosophy presupposes (the legitimacy of) the concept of 
metaphor; 
(D3) Philosophy cannot accommodate the concept of metaphor. 
Here is the evidence that Derrida himself is making these claims. 
(D1) and (D2) can be seen as two sides of the central claim of 
'White Mythology': 
[M]etaphor remains, in all its essential characteristics, a classical 
philosopheme.2 
If we take '-pheme' to be a way of avoiding the word 'concept' (in 
part because the word 'concept' might itself be thought to presup- 
pose the philosophical enterprise), and then use the word 'concept' 
to put the point more simply, this says that the concept of metaphor 
is a philosophical concept; which, I take it, implies at least (D1) but 
also probably (D2). 
Thesis (D1) is drawn out explicitly in a remark which asserts the 
impossibility of commenting on the use of metaphor in philosophy 
from a position which is philosophically neutral: 
[I]t is impossible to dominate philosophical metaphorics as such, 
from the exterior, by using a concept of metaphor which remains 
a philosophical product.3 
Derrida's commitment o (D2) is made clear when he describes a 
certain claim as 
an already philosophical thesis, one might even say philosophy's 
unique thesis, the thesis which constitutes the concept of 
metaphor, the opposition of the proper and the nonproper ...' 
(I will return in a moment to the claim which is here described.) 
Thesis (D3) can be seen as arising from two claims. Derrida says: 
[P]hilosophy is deprived of what it provides itself. Its instru- 
ments belonging to its field, philosophy is incapable of dominat- 
ing its general tropology and metaphorics.' 
2 Ibid., 219. 
3 Ibid., 228. 
4Ibid., 229. 
5 Ibid., 228. 
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That is, philosophy cannot 'dominate' the concept of metaphor. But 
philosophy is also held to be somehow committed to the ideal of 
'domination'; for example, Derrida says, the concept of concept 
(itself held to be both central to philosophy and irreducibly 
metaphorical) 'cannot not retain the gesture of mastery'.' 
Many philosophers will be unhappy about this: it will seem to 
them to be a vague and metaphorical characterization of the com- 
mitments of philosophy. But this unhappiness only provides the 
entry for a second argument (which might be thought to be an alter- 
native formulation of the first). The second argument has it that 
philosophy is committed to thinking that every genuine concept, 
and every genuine distinction, is non-metaphorical. This, I think, is 
what Derrida calls 'philosophy's unique thesis'; he puts it as follows: 
[T]he sense aimed at through these figures is an essence rigor- 
ously independent of that which transports it.7 
That is to say that the metaphors considered here though the 
point presumably applies to all metaphors-are in principle dis- 
pensable: the same concepts and distinctions could be expressed 
non-metaphorically. But Derrida also claims that the concept of 
metaphor is itself irreducibly metaphorical.' We can lay these two 
claims out, as follows: 
(D3a) Philosophy is committed to thinking that every genuine 
concept or distinction can be expressed non-metaphorically; 
(D3b) The concept of metaphor, and the distinctions on which it 
depends, cannot be expressed non-metaphorically. 
It is important to be cautious about what is being claimed about 
philosophy in (D3a). Philosophy does not, according to this, have to 
object to the use of metaphors in general; nor does it have to avoid 
using metaphors itself, as a stylistic device. And it need not think 
that metaphors are dispensable in any particular text. Obviously, if 
metaphors were thought to be indispensable, some account would 
then have to be given of what metaphors do which does not involve 
the idea of essentially metaphorical concepts and distinctions; but it 
might seem that there was some room for manoeuvre here. 
Nevertheless, the three (or four) theses which I have attributed to 
Derrida make large presumptions about the nature of philosophy 
and of metaphor, which need to be exposed and subjected to criti- 
cal scrutiny. 
6 Ibid., 224. 
7 Ibid., 229. 
8 Ibid., 220, for example. 
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II 
Derrida supports (D1), (D2) and (D3a) by analysis of particular 
texts. Those who have purported to analyse metaphors in philo- 
sophical texts from some neutral, non-philosophical (or at least 
metaphilosophical), perspective are found in fact to have presup- 
posed a certain traditional kind of philosophical theory. 
Philosophers are found to have used metaphors at certain funda- 
mental points in their systems, and to have defined their goals by 
implicit contrast with metaphorical description. Moreover, they 
have repeatedly shown themselves to be committed to the view that 
concepts and distinctions are, in general, independent of any par- 
ticular mode of expression; and the insistence that no genuine con- 
cept or distinction needs to be expressed by means of a metaphor 
belongs with that in the texts Derrida analyses.' 
He also offers the same kind of empirical support for (D3b), show- 
ing the recurrence of metaphors in the characterization of metaphor 
in the history of philosophy."' And he goes further in this case, 
attempting to characterize metaphor himself, and finding himself 
(unsurprisingly) constantly using metaphors in the characterization." 
Derrida inevitably has to be selective in his analysis of texts; but 
there is no immediate reason to think that the selection is badly 
biassed. Many of the philosophers considered seem to have been 
caught off their guard in the passages Derrida considers, but the 
kind of incautiousness they display is itself prevalent in discussions 
of these themes. And it is easy enough to find other texts in the his- 
tory of philosophy which have a similar tendency, and hard to think 
of any which would suggest a radically different view. And although 
some of his analyses may be tendentious on some points, they seem 
broadly fair in their discovery of views which support (D1)-(D3). 
It is hard to read Derrida's analyses without a sense that it is 
inevitable that he will find what in fact he does find. Moreover, I 
suspect that most honest philosophers will recognize what Derrida 
finds in the history of philosophy as at least close to something they 
hold themselves, although they may feel that they are not really 
committed to it, that they could change their minds on this without 
affecting much of the rest of their philosophy. 
9 The link between metaphor and the general distinction between signi- 
fier and signified is brought out at 'White Mythology', pp. 227-8. 
10 In particular in the section of 'White Mythology' entitled 'The 
Ellipsis of the Sun'. 
1 Derrida does this in the opening pages of his 'The Retrait of 
Metaphor', trans. F Gasdner, B. Iginla, R. Madden and W. Best, Enclitic 
2 (1978), pp. 5-33. 
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Nevertheless, the evidence of the history of philosophy, and of 
most philosophers' sneaking consciousness of their own inclina- 
tions, does not really constitute an argument for (D1)-(D3).`2 For it 
could be just that there has been a whole tradition of mistaken 
theory about metaphor; and the inevitability with which philoso- 
phers seem to commit themselves to this theory might be no more 
than a kind of psychological inevitability, which would explain the 
perennial temptation of the theory. The problem, in short, is that 
(D1)-(D3) are philosophical claims, and no amount of empirical 
evidence can justify a philosophical claim. 
What is needed is some conception of what is necessary to and 
distinctive of philosophy as such. A hint of where to look is provid- 
ed by Derrida's account of (some of the history of) the concept of 
the 'proper'. On the one hand, the 'proper' stands to the 'non-prop- 
er' as the literal stands to the non-literal: these concepts and this 
distinction are presupposed by the concept of metaphor. And on the 
other hand, according to Derrida, the notion of the 'proper' picks 
out a central philosophical value. Crucially, the 'proper' is associat- 
ed with univocity: that is, unity and coherence of meaning. And 
Derrida claims: 
Univocity is the essence, or better, the telos of language. No phi- 
losophy, as such, has ever renounced this Aristotelian ideal. This 
ideal is philosophy.13 
This ideal is linked in Aristotle, in a way which Derrida takes to be 
fundamental to philosophy, with the principle of non-contradic- 
tion. 14 
These hints can be developed to provide fairly explicit character- 
izations of philosophy and of metaphor. These characterizations 
will not be uncontroversial, of course, but I think they are at least 
plausible. 
III 
A connection between metaphor and philosophy is suggested by two 
rather different exts; and this can then be used to provide a char- 
12 G. Bennington appears to deny this in G. Bennington and J. Derrida, 
Jacques Derrida, trans. G. Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), p. 129: but this denial does not follow from the premise which 
is offered for it, that the words and concepts involved are not arbitrary, but 
have a history. 
13 'White Mythology', p. 247. 
14 Ibid., 248. The reference to Aristotle is to Metaphysics, 1005b35ff. 
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acterization of the nature of philosophy. At the beginning of his 
'Letter on Humanism', Heidegger says, 'Language is the house of 
Being'. The surprising claim comes towards the end of this paper; 
Heidegger says: 
The talk about the house of Being is no transfer of the image 
'house' to Being. But one day we will, by thinking the essence of 
Being in a way appropriate to its matter, more readily be able to 
think what 'house' and 'to dwell' are.15 
I take it that this means that 'Language is the house of Being' is not 
a metaphor; it is only taken to be a metaphor by someone who does 
not really understand the concepts of house and dwelling. Similarly, 
Wittgenstein appears to claim, in the Tractatus, that propositions 
are literally pictures.'6 This may not be our normal view, but it can 
be justified by a philosophical account of pictures. 
What is suggested here is that it is the business of philosophy to 
provide or reach an understanding of the nature or essence of 
things, to understand what it is to be X, whatever X may be. And 
when we talk of 'what it is to be X', we always mean what it is to be 
literally (that is, non-metaphorically) X. 
We can link this simple thought to univocity of meaning as fol- 
lows. In order to make sense of the possibility of truth and falsity 
in the use of a particular word or concept, we must see all the uses 
of that word or concept as being answerable to a certain common 
standard; unless we can make sense of the same standard applying 
to both the true and the false cases, we cannot distinguish between 
a false use of the same word or concept and a true use of a different 
one. There are various ways of thinking of this common standard, 
but the most non-committal takes it to be the unifying point or 
rationale of the legitimate uses of a given word or concept. The idea 
is that any particular use of a word or concept must be answerable 
to comparisons with other uses of the same word or concept; and to 
be recognized as legitimate it must be seen to be subject to the ratio- 
nale which unifies those other uses. This unifying point is, in effect, 
the meaning of the word or the core of the concept: it is that in 
virtue of which the legitimate uses are legitimate; and, together 
with the actual state of the world, it is that in virtue of which true 
uses are true and false uses are false. The connection with the sim- 
ple account of (a crucial part of) the business of philosophy which 
1 M. Heidegger, Basic Writings, D. Krell (ed.), (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1977), pp. 236-7. 
16 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), ?4011. 
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I have extracted from Heidegger and Wittgenstein is this: to under- 
stand what it is to be X, whatever X may be, is to understand the 
unifying point or rationale of the legitimate uses of the word for or 
concept of X. 
Naturally, a contrast must be presumed with the merely illegiti- 
mate uses of the word or concept. What is more interesting about 
the claims made by Heidegger and Wittgenstein is that a contrast is 
presumed with the metaphorical. But there is a natural justification 
for that further presumption: it is that, although things which are 
metaphorically X do in some way fall within the rationale for the 
word for or concept of X, there is nevertheless a sense in which they 
do not. Consequently, given the actual state of the world, something 
which is only metaphorically X will seem to be in a way X, and in a 
way not X. There is evidently a threat that including the metaphor- 
ical uses with the uses for which a unifying rationale has to be found 
would lead one at worst into contradiction, and at best into simple 
indeterminacy. So it is natural to insist that the legitimate uses of a 
word or concept must be contrasted with the metaphorical uses, as 
well as with the simply illegitimate uses. 
This general conception of philosophy seems to me close in spirit 
to what Derrida has in mind, independently attractive to philoso- 
phers themselves, and very modest. It is modest because its validity 
seems to be presupposed by the very idea of truth and falsehood. 
Someone might deny this, on the grounds that 'family resemblance' 
concepts provide an example of concepts for which there is a dif- 
ference between truth and falsehood, without there being any uni- 
fying rationale. But 'family resemblance' concepts do have a unify- 
ing point or rationale; it is just not one which can be captured in a 
simple formula which is usefully applicable to every case. The unity 
is evident in the metaphor of 'family resemblance' itself: the 
assumption is that we are dealing with resemblances between dif- 
ferent members of the same family. 'Family resemblance' concepts 
are a difficulty for a certain precisification of the general conception 
of philosophy I have outlined, but not for the general conception 
itself. 
It may yet be objected that much is done in philosophy which 
cannot be construed as being an attempt simply to understand the 
essence or nature of something, in the sense I have characterized. 
This is no doubt true, but it does not undermine the general con- 
ception of philosophy as having such an understanding of nature 
and essence as an integral part of its business; and such an under- 
standing of nature and essence is generally presupposed in other 
philosophical work. Or again, it may be objected that the philo- 
sophical understanding of nature and essence does not need to be 
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thought of as being a matter of understanding the unifying point or 
rationale behind the legitimate uses of words or concepts; it might 
be thought that such a view of understanding the nature of things 
went out of fashion with ordinary language philosophy. It is cer- 
tainly true that there are other views of what it is to form a philo- 
sophical understanding of nature and essence, but this view has not 
really been discredited: attempts to abandon the conception of a 
priori truths have troubles of their own; and it is unclear how we 
can characterize the a priori except in terms of the unifying ratio- 
nale behind the legitimate uses of words or concepts. Nor does this 
view of what it is to understand the nature and essence of things 
depend upon anything like ordinary language philosophy; in fact, it 
tends to undermine ordinary language philosophy to the extent that 
it recommends that we revise our everyday judgments about the 
legitimate use of words on the basis of a unifying conception of the 
rationale behind such uses. 
IV 
Nevertheless, this general conception of philosophy will not sup- 
port any of (D1)-(D3) on its own: we will also need a certain con- 
ception of what metaphor is. How must we think of metaphor to 
make (Dl) plausible, in the way in which Derrida intends it? 
The first step is to say that the concept of metaphor depends on 
the distinction between 'proper' and 'non-proper' uses of a word or 
concept. And the 'proper' uses, I have suggested, are those which 
are united by the kind of unifying rationale which it is the business 
of philosophy to understand. This is not yet enough for (Dl), how- 
ever, if (DI) is to be understood as it has to be for one of the cen- 
tral purposes of Derrida's paper. For Derrida is concerned to show 
that using the concept of metaphor already commits one to the 
enterprise of philosophy: this is why any attempt to debunk philos- 
ophy from outside, on the grounds that it is a 'white mythology', 
must undermine itself. But this is not shown simply by showing that 
the concept of metaphor depends on the distinction between the 
'proper' and the 'non-proper'. For the concept of metaphor might 
be parasitic upon that distinction, and then subvert it. And if this 
were the case, the concept of metaphor could be thought of as a 
kind of post-philosophical concept, whose use did not at all commit 
one to the values of philosophy: philosophy would only be of inter- 
est as the prey which the concept feeds on. 
For (Dl) to be established in the way which Derrida's argument 
requires, it must be the case that anyone who uses the concept of 
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metaphor is himself committed to the need for and legitimacy of a 
unifying rationale to the 'proper'-that is, at least the non- 
metaphorical-uses. What bearing does this have on the claim that 
something is metaphorically X? It seems to mean that making such 
a claim itself implies that the thing in question is not, or not there- 
by, really X. In this 'really' the fundamental validity of the 'proper' 
uses is endorsed. 
What reason might there be for accepting (D2)? The assumption 
seems to be that the project of understanding the rationale for those 
uses of a concept for which there is a unifying rationale can only be 
understood if those uses are contrasted with metaphorical uses: 
unless that contrast is made, the class of uses which philosophy is 
concerned with will not be well defined. There would be no need of 
such a specific contrast if things which are metaphorically X (what- 
ever being X may be) were simply things which are not really X: 
they would simply fall into the larger class of things which are not 
X. The specific contrast with metaphorical uses is only necessary if 
these uses are somehow legitimate and rationalizable after all: that 
is, if things which are metaphorically X are somehow X. 
This seems to me plausible enough, given the plausibility of the 
conception of metaphor which it requires. (I shall return to that in 
the next section.) But it is not enough for (D2). What has been 
shown so far is just that if there is such a thing as being metaphori- 
cally X, which involves being both somehow X and somehow not 
X, then the uses which need to be unified by the kind of rationale 
which philosophy aims for will need to be contrasted with 
metaphorical uses. What (D2) requires, if we are to continue with 
this general conception of the nature of philosophy, is that the kind 
of use which philosophy is concerned with can only be made sense 
of if there is such a thing as being metaphorically X, which involves 
being both somehow X and somehow not X. This kind of appar- 
ently paradoxical use has to be possible if the non-paradoxical uses 
are to be possible. 
This claim has a character which is similar to that of other 
Derridean claims: the apparently parasitic case needs to be possible 
for the apparently non-parasitic case to be intelligible; and the 
apparently non-parasitic ase can only be understood in terms of its 
contrast with the apparently parasitic case.7 This particular claim 
might be thought to be especially problematic, however, because the 
apparently parasitic case seems to be paradoxical. I shall offer a rea- 
son for accepting it, but this may not convince everyone. 
17 A famous example is Derrida's discussion of Austin, in 'Signature, 
Event, Context', in Margins of Philosophy, pp. 309-30, at pp. 321-7. 
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Philosophy, according to the conception I have outlined, is con- 
cerned with certain straightforward contrasts: between true and 
false applications of the same word or concept; and between correct 
and incorrect uses. In the terms of these straightforward contrasts, 
there is a simple contradiction between saying that something is X 
and saying that it is not X, while using the word for or concept of 
X correctly. And there is a similarly straightforward contrast 
between using a word or concept correctly and misusing it (as 
someone might who simply did not understand what a word meant, 
for example). There is not even the hint of a contradiction in some- 
thing's being said to be both X and not-X if one of the uses of the 
concept is simply a misuse. 
We might wonder at this point about this conception of straight- 
forwardness, which seems so appropriate here. How are we to 
understand it? A natural suggestion is: by contrast with what is not 
straightforward. Saying non-straightforwardly that something is X 
would be a kind of saying that it is X which did not provide a sim- 
ple contradiction with saying straightforwardly that it is not X, but 
which was not itself a straightforward misuse of the concept X. But 
this kind of non-straightforward use of a concept is just a 
metaphorical use, according to the conception of metaphor which 
seems to be required if we accept that the uses for which philosophy 
is to concerned to find a rationale need to be contrasted with 
metaphorical uses. So it is natural to think that the kind of straight- 
forwardness which seems to be involved in the contrasts which are 
presupposed in philosophical understanding can only itself be 
understood by contrast with the metaphorical. 
Is it really essential to philosophy that it involves a kind of 
straightforwardness which is to be contrasted with the metaphor- 
ical? Here are two further reasons for thinking that it is. First, if 
this kind of straightforwardness, understood in terms of a contrast 
with the metaphorical, is essential to philosophy, it can be used as 
part of a characterization of philosophy as a discipline. In partic- 
ular, it can be used to contrast a philosophical treatment of a text 
with a literary one. If we follow a commonplace conception of a 
philosophical approach to a text, we will suppose that the philoso- 
pher is concerned to ask whether what is said is true; and given 
that the possibility of truth depends on the existence of a rationale 
which unifies the uses of concepts, this will require some unifica- 
tion of the use of concepts in the text with other uses of those con- 
cepts. A literary approach to a text, by contrast, (according to a 
similarly commonplace conception of literature) is not concerned 
with the truth of what is said, and consequently can dwell on and 
exploit what is non-straightforward about the use of concepts, 
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what cannot be precisely unified with other uses of the same con- 
cepts. 8 
The second additional reason for thinking that philosophy essen- 
tially involves a kind of straightforwardness which contrasts with 
the metaphorical, on the conception of metaphor which has been 
outlined briefly here, is that this would explain why philosophers 
have been concerned with metaphor in particular among figures. A 
classical rhetoric will count metaphor as merely one among many 
figures of speech; but there is a vast philosophical literature about 
metaphor, and almost none about simile, or synecdoche, or hypal- 
lage, except insofar as these other figures are brought into a discus- 
sion of metaphor. A natural explanation of this is that metaphor is 
uniquely paradoxical, and uniquely disturbing to philosophy. This 
would make sense if (D2) were true. 
This may not be enough to remove every doubt about (D2). But 
it does seem enough to mean that (D2) should be taken seriously. 
V 
(D1) and (D2) require something very simple, and at the same time 
rather bewildering, about the concept of metaphor: for something 
to be metaphorically X is for it to be X, without being really X." I 
shall not offer here a positive account of how there could be such a 
thing as metaphor, if this description of metaphors is right. But the 
fact that the description is, on the face of it, paradoxical seems to me 
to count for rather than against it: this would explain the persistence 
of the problem of metaphor. 
But although I shall not be offering any positive account of 
metaphor, it is important o emphasize that the general conception of 
metaphor which is required for (D1) and (D2) is already inconsistent 
with the two most distinctive types of philosophical theory of 
metaphor, as well as some familiar commonplaces about metaphor 
and meaning. I will argue briefly that this conflict with various 
18 Someone might object to the apparent naivety of this contrast between 
philosophical and literary issues, thinking that Derrida himself has put it 
in question. I think this is a misunderstanding of Derrida; his work seems 
to me to be best seen as, as it were, metaphorically philosophical (or 
literary), on the conception of metaphor which has been outlined here: it 
is both in a way philosophical and in a way not philosophical. But this 
claim itself presupposes a clear distinction between what is and what is not 
properly philosophical. 
19 This actually seems to be required by the relation between philosophy 
and metaphor which is assumed by Heidegger and Wittgenstein. 
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received views about metaphor is a point-arguably the same 
point-in favour of the conception required for (D1) and (D2). 
First, we will need to reject the view that in metaphorical uses a 
secondary, metaphorical meaning is exploited.20 For if to say that 
something is metaphorically X is to say that it is X in a different 
sense, then it is unclear why it implies that the thing is not really X, 
on the relevant understanding of 'really'. But it is clear anyway that 
we cannot give a satisfactory account of metaphor simply by saying 
that metaphors involve a secondary meaning of the relevant words: 
for there are secondary meanings which are not metaphorical. And 
it is quite unclear how we could repair this defect without explicit- 
ly insisting that in metaphors the secondary meanings are 
metaphorical meanings; but this would be circular in an account of 
metaphor, as well as being disruptive of the notion of meaning. 
Secondly, we will have to reject the Davidsonian view that to 
describe as metaphorical someone's saying that a thing is X is just 
to think that the thing is so obviously X or not X that the saying 
must be meant as an invitation to think of it in some new way.2' For 
consider the most common case, in which the thing in question is 
obviously not X. What Davidson's view fails to take account of is 
that the thing is nevertheless somehow X. This is what is needed, if 
we are to make sense of (D2). And we surely need it anyway, if we 
are to do justice to metaphors. For Davidson's view fails to acknowl- 
edge the fact that when we use a word metaphorically, the use is, in 
a way, subject to the rationale which unites the non-metaphorical 
uses of the same word. This is what leads to the most obviously 
implausible feature of Davidson's view, that the relation between a 
metaphor and someone who hears it or reads is merely one of cause 
and psychological effect:22 there is no such thing, strictly speaking, 
as understanding a metaphor; all that can be understood is the 
speaker's motives in trying to produce that effect. (It is noticeable 
in this connection that Davidson's account cannot accommodate the 
20This view is the target of D. Davidson, 'What Metaphors Mean', in 
his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 1984), 
pp. 245-64. 
21 This is the positive view of 'What Metaphors Mean'. In fact, I see no 
reason to count any metaphors as depending on absurdly obvious literal 
truths: Donne's famous 'No man is an island', for example, does not strike 
me as being metaphorical itself; rather, it presupposes a metaphor, that 
man is one kind of land mass rather than another. And Davidson's exam- 
ple, 'Business is business' ('What Metaphors Mean', p. 258), seems to me 
obviously not metaphorical. 
22 Davidson's most extreme statement of this point is in his likening of 
the operation of metaphors to the effect of a bump on the head: 'What 
Metaphors Mean', p. 262. 
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idea of being metaphorically X: he can at best approximate that 
notion by talk of being metaphorically said to be X.) 
We can see that these two familiar approaches go wrong in failing 
to do justice to the paradox in any sensitive description of metaphor. 
Each attempts to give an account of metaphor by suppressing one 
side of the paradox. The 'secondary-meaning' view makes some 
sense of the way in which something which is metaphorically X is 
somehow X, but it does not deal with the way in which it is not really 
X. The Davidsonian view, in the most common cases at least, makes 
some sense of the way in which something which is metaphorically 
X is not really X; but it does not account for the way in which it is 
X. This reinforces the point that if the conception of metaphor 
demanded by (D1) and (D2) preserves the paradox in the natural 
description of metaphor, that counts in favour of (D1) and (D2). 
(D1) also has a consequence about the relation between 
metaphoricity and the knowledge of speakers and hearers. For if a 
use is metaphorical if it both in a way conforms, and in a way does 
not conform to the unifying rationale which philosophy leads one to 
understand, then just as one cannot take something to be metaphor- 
ical without being committed to some philosophy, so one cannot 
know that something is metaphorical without having got the philos- 
ophy right. If we assume that philosophy is not just a systematiza- 
tion of what ordinary speakers and hearers already think, this 
means that ordinary speakers and hearers may be wrong in suppos- 
ing that something is metaphorical. And, conversely, there seems no 
clear reason to deny that something could be metaphorical without 
its being recognized as such by ordinary speakers and hearers. This 
conflicts with a common view which holds that forms of words 
which are no longer seen as metaphors are dead metaphors, and that 
dead metaphors are ex-metaphors.23 For the assumption behind this 
common view seems to be that something cannot be a metaphor 
without being taken to be one by ordinary speakers and hearers. 
It does not immediately follow from this, however, that whether 
a use is metaphorical is independent of a speaker's intentions. 
Intention is often appealed to in order to distinguish between 
metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses of the same words in the 
same sentences.24 I doubt if such an appeal can be necessary, since 
we often judge that certain uses are metaphorical without any inde- 
23 For this view, see, e.g., M. Black, 'More about Metaphor', in A. Ortony, 
(ed.), Metaphor and Thought (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
pp. 19-41, at p. 25; Davidson, 'What Metaphors Mean', p. 252; N. 
Goodman, Languages of Art (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981), p. 71. 
24 See, e.g., M. Bergmann, 'Metaphorical Assertions', The Philosophical 
Review 91 (1982), pp. 229-45, at p. 232. 
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pendent access to the intentions of the author. But a need to appeal 
to intention is not ruled out simply by saying that ordinary speak- 
ers and hearers may be wrong about what is metaphorical: this sim- 
ply means that intention-even recognized intention-is not enough 
to decide what is metaphorical. 
The links between metaphor and philosophy which are stated in 
(DI) and (D2) have some consequences for the kinds of things 
which can be metaphors. A metaphor will be a particular use of a 
word or concept to apply to a particular thing or kind of thing. It 
will be such a use of a word or concept which is, in the first instance, 
metaphorical. A sentence, or an utterance, or a poem may be 
metaphorical too: but only in virtue of containing a metaphorical 
use of a word or concept. This, again, seems to me at least not 
unnatural: it need only be resisted by someone adopting Davidson's 
theory, but that is implausible anyway. And it provides room for the 
possibility that the concept of metaphor might itself be metaphori- 
cal, which (D3b) requires. To claim that the concept of metaphor is 
metaphorical would be to claim that the use of the concept of 
metaphor to describe the things which we call metaphors (that is, 
metaphorical uses of concepts and words) is metaphorical. That 
would mean that (the things we call) metaphors are not really 
metaphors; so presumably something else-some kind of transport 
or transfer, perhaps25-would really be a metaphor. 
VI 
In order to do justice to (Dl) and (D2), we have been led to pre- 
liminary general characterizations of the nature of philosophy, and 
of metaphor. Both of these general characterizations seem to be 
independently attractive. That means that we will have some diffi- 
culty keeping philosophy itself, and anyone who uses the concept of 
metaphor, clear of contradiction if (D3) is true. 
So is (D3) true, on the understanding of the nature of philosophy 
and of metaphor which I have been elaborating? I think it depends 
upon how the general conception of philosophical understanding 
which I have outlined is elaborated. According to the general con- 
ception, the philosopher aims to understand the rationale which 
unifies the correct uses of a particular word or concept. This ratio- 
nale will provide some understanding of why each particular correct 
application is correct. The fundamental issue is over whether this 
25 Goodman makes crucial use of the metaphors of transport and trans- 
fer in his discussion of metaphor: see especially, Languages of Art, pp. 
74-80. 
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rationale is supposed to be part of a ground for true application- 
that is, application which produces true judgments or statements- 
in a certain familiar sense of 'ground'. Here is an attempt at a defi- 
nition: 
Something is the ground for the true application of a word or con- 
cept if and only if, for each particular occasion, 
(Gi) It is sufficient, in conjunction with the meaning of the other 
words in the sentence in which the word occurs, or the other 
concepts involved in the judgment, and the actual situation 
in the world, to determine whether or not the word or con- 
cept is truly applied; and 
(G2) It can be recognized as determining whether or not the word 
or concept is truly applied independently of actually decid- 
ing whether to apply the word or concept on that occasion- 
at least in cases where it is possible to know whether the 
word or concept is truly applied. 
(Note that (G2) is concerned with whether something can be recog- 
nized as determining truth independently of deciding to apply a 
word or concept: it does not make truth itself a matter of decision.) 
To see what hangs on this, consider a judgment that something is 
a stone. We can imagine a rationalization of that judgment being 
represented by a simple argument: 
(Si) Anything which is like that is a stone; 
(S2) This is like that; so 
(S3) This is a stone. 
The phrase 'like that' here is meant to express my rationalizing con- 
ception of what it is to be a stone. The question whether it could 
form part of a ground for correct application of the concept of a 
stone turns on the relative status of the premises and the conclusion 
in a simple argument of this form. 
We can imagine the relationship between premises and conclu- 
sion taking one of two forms in practice. It may be that I actually 
derive (S3) from (SI) and (S2): in this case my judgment of (S3) is 
clearly dependent upon (Si) and (S2); and my judgment of (S1) and 
(S2) will be independent of my judgment of (S3). Alternatively, we 
may suppose that I am simply trained to use a particular word or 
concept in particular situations; if the judgment of (S3) is the prod- 
uct of such basic training, it will be independent of (Si) and (S2); 
(Si) and (S2) will provide a rationalization after the fact for the 
judgment. In this kind of case, we can imagine some negotiation 
taking place between my judgment about a particular situation 
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(such as (S3)) and my rationalizing conception: sometimes my judg- 
ment about the particular situation may lead me to revise my con- 
ception of what it is for something to be a stone (say); and some- 
times my general conception of what it is to be a stone may lead my 
to revise my judgment about a particular situation. 
Now a general rationalizing conception will form part of the 
ground for the use of a particular word or concept (in the sense spec- 
ified by the definition I have offered) if it always trumps any inde- 
pendently formed judgment about a particular case. It needs to have 
a kind of authority which is in principle not open to question in the 
light of judgments about particular cases. Otherwise it will not be 
possible to avoid considering the application of the word or concept 
in the particular case, as (G2) requires. 
We can now imagine two different ways of elaborating the gener- 
al view of philosophy which I outlined earlier. According to one 
elaboration, the task of philosophy is to equip one with a ground for 
the true application of concepts, in just the sense which I have 
defined. We are looking for something which can be settled once 
and for all, from which the truth of true applications simply follows, 
given an appropriate knowledge of the state of the world. On this 
conception, philosophical understanding is in principle theoretical: 
there is some theory knowledge of which would constitute what it is 
tempting to think of as a grasp of the concepts being considered. 
According to the other elaboration, philosophical understanding is 
irreducibly practical in the sense that it is fundamentally an ability 
to make the right judgments in particular circumstances; no theo- 
retical knowledge could have decisive authority over particular 
judgments. On this conception, understanding the unifying ratio- 
nale for the use of a particular word or concept is a matter of being 
able to make judgments about each use in the light of its relation to 
others; but it is not knowledge of a ground for the true application 
of concepts. Let us call these two elaborations the theoretical and 
non-theoretical conceptions of philosophy, respectively. 
VII 
Derrida's arguments for (D3) seem to me to have some chance of 
working against the theoretical conception of philosophy, but not 
against the non-theoretical conception. There were two arguments 
for (D3). The first took philosophy to be committed to the ideal of 
domination, and then claimed that philosophy could not dominate 
metaphor, precisely because metaphor was a philosophical concept 
in the sense required for (D2). Now why does the fact that philosophy 
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presupposes the legitimacy of the concept of metaphor mean that 
philosophy cannot dominate metaphor? The problem seems to be 
that domination is taken to be something which is practised from 
some standpoint which is independent of what it dominates. So to 
say that philosophy is committed to the ideal of domination is to say 
that philosophy is concerned in general to adopt a perspective which 
will be independent of that which it is concerned with. 
The theoretical conception of philosophy does seem to be com- 
mitted to this ideal, and therefore to face the difficulty posed by 
(D3) on the basis of this first argument. For each case of the appli- 
cation of a concept, the theoretical conception seeks a vantage point 
which is independent of that application from which the application 
can be decisively justified. Now consider the concept of what is pos- 
sible, and in particular the judgment: 
(M) Metaphors (on the conception required for (D1) and (D2)) 
are possible. 
To meet its own demands, the theoretical conception would have to 
hold that it is possible to form a general conception of what is pos- 
sible, which can itself be appreciated independently of deciding on 
the truth or falsity of (M), and from which the truth or falsity of 
(M) follows. But the kind of possibility at issue in (M) is metaphys- 
ical or philosophical possibility. It follows that if (D2) is right, the 
truth of (M) must already have been decided in forming a legitimate 
conception of what is, in that sense, possible. 
This looks like a way of spelling out Derrida's first argument for 
(D3), but it appears only to affect he theoretical conception of phi- 
losophy. If we can really make sense of a non-theoretical way of 
doing philosophy, it will be immune to this objection. 
The other argument for (D3) depended on two further claims: 
(D3a) Philosophy is committed to thinking that every genuine con- 
cept or distinction can be expressed non-metaphorically; 
(D3b) The concept of metaphor, and the distinctions on which it 
depends, cannot be expressed non-metaphorically. 
I shall not consider whether (D3b) is true. The crucial point is that 
(D3a) only seems to hold for the theoretical conception of philoso- 
phy. (D3a) seems to hold for the theoretical conception of philoso- 
phy because no particular device or mode of expression can be 
essential to any distinction or concept, according to that conception. 
Here is the reason for that. The theoretical conception of philos- 
ophy is committed to the possibility of providing a theoretical 
model of a certain kind of practical ability. The practical abilities it 
is concerned with are the abilities to use particular concepts and the 
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abilities to speak particular languages. To provide a theoretical 
model of such abilities is to provide something which is indepen- 
dent of the ability to use those very concepts, or those very words, 
which could ground such use. But this will provide one with a way 
of appreciating the distinctions on which the use of these words and 
concepts rests which is independent of them. It ought then to be 
possible simply to introduce by definition some new mode of 
expression of the very same distinctions. It will be hard to see why 
metaphors are not always dispensable (except for decorative or emo- 
tive purposes) on such a view. 
The non-theoretical conception of philosophy is committed to no 
such thesis of the dispensability of particular modes of expression. 
(Indeed, the whole idea of the 'expression' of something which is 
presumably itself independent of the expression ought to be ques- 
tionable on the non-theoretical view.) Consequently, it is not vul- 
nerable in this way to Derrida's argument. There is a sense in which 
even the non-theoretical conception cannot 'accommodate' 
metaphorical uses, but this need not lead to any kind of internal 
contradiction within philosophy. 
To see this, consider a particular type of metaphorical use of a 
word or concept: say, the use of the word 'dragon' to characterize a 
particularly fierce kind of woman. There is no reason in principle 
why someone should not seek a philosophical understanding of the 
rationale which unifies the 'proper' uses of this metaphor. One will 
be concerned to understand how someone has to be to be a dragon 
(why, for example, the metaphor is supposed to apply most natural- 
ly to women). The 'proper' uses of the metaphor, which are sup- 
posed to be unified by the rationale which the philosopher aims to 
understand, must be contrasted, of course, with certain supposed 
'non-proper' uses. But these can be made sense of: we might think 
of a (higher-order) metaphorical use of the dragon metaphor to 
apply to a plant among other plants, say, or to a particular kind of 
philosophical style. 
VIII 
It seems to me, in conclusion, that a decent case can be made for 
(D1) and (D2), but that the problem they create is for a particular 
conception of philosophy, rather than philosophy itself. Indeed, if 
we are convinced by (D1) and (D2), we will take them to form the 
basis of an argument for rejecting the theoretical conception of phi- 
losophy. 
But I suspect that such a rejection would require a more general 
242 
This content downloaded from 139.184.30.131 on Wed, 16 Oct 2013 06:39:43 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Metaphor and Philosophy: an Encounter with Derrida 
upheaval of our philosophical preconceptions than it might, at first 
sight, seem to do. And if that is right, it is understandable that 
someone might (as Derrida seems to do) identify philosophy itself 
with the theoretical conception of philosophy. Here are four indica- 
tions of the difficulty of rejecting the theoretical conception of phi- 
losophy. 
First, if we reject the theoretical conception, we ought to be wary 
about the idea of something which makes a particular judgment 
true, or of something which makes one thing rather than another a 
correct application of a rule. For it seems that the point of using the 
word 'makes' here is to suggest that a certain judgment about the 
particular case is somehow forced on us by something which is rec- 
ognizable independently of considering that judgment. Attempts to 
say what it is to follow a rule, for example, whether they are psy- 
chologistic, anthropologistic, or Platonist all seem to have this char- 
acter.26 But this means that they are all committed to the conception 
of ground which underlies the theoretical conception of philosophy. 
Secondly, we generally operate with a conception of justification 
which depends upon something like the notion of ground which I 
have characterized. We generally demand that justifications be 
objective, in at least the minimal sense that the legitimacy or truth 
of what is cited as a justification must be recognizable independent- 
ly of deciding on the legitimacy or truth of what it is meant to jus- 
tify. This is an absolutely commonplace demand, even if it is gen- 
erally not made explicit: it seems to underlie the classical problem 
of induction, for example. But if we question the general legitima- 
cy of the notion of ground which I have characterized, then we have 
no right to insist, in general, that justifications must be objective in 
this sense. And we will then have to make sense of a kind of practi- 
cal justification which does not make the same demands. 
Thirdly, it seems that it is only commitment o the existence of 
some ground of correctness wherever there is correctness which 
leads us to think that languages are systems of signs, where a sign is 
something intrinsically meaningless which is somehow assigned a 
meaning, or else a kind of compound of an intrinsically meaning- 
less thing and an assigned meaning. The core of the idea that lan- 
guages are systems of signs in this sense is that the fundamental 
issue of correctness in the use of a word does not depend upon its 
being that very word which is used. The assumption here is that the 
basic work is done by a rule for use, which could equally well have 
been a rule for using a different word. But such a rule for use, 
26 I have in mind here the debates about Wittgenstein prompted by S. 
Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1982). 
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whether stated in terms of the concepts expressed by words or the 
properties referred to by them, must then constitute a ground for 
correctness, in the sense defined by (Gi) and (G2). It looks as if this 
conception of language depends upon thinking there must be some 
ground of correctness wherever there is correctness. If that is right, 
then the consequences of abandoning that commitment will be sig- 
nificant; for almost everything that has ever been written in the phi- 
losophy of language has assumed that languages are systems of 
signs. 
Finally, some of the most basic concepts of philosophy at least 
trace their history through the theoretical conception of philosophy. 
Here are two examples. The concept of theory derives from the idea 
that philosophical understanding is a kind of vision: it is natural to 
understand this vision as providing one with access to something 
which would then simply yield correct judgments about particular 
cases. And the concept of concept (like the German 'Begriff') 
derives from the idea of something which is grasped: again, the idea 
seems to be of something which, once got hold of, is immune to fur- 
ther revision and will settle all disputes. It is natural to see these 
concepts, as Derrida does, as belonging to a whole network of 
metaphors which embody the theoretical conception of philosophy, 
and constantly tempt one towards it.27 
University of Sussex 
27 See e.g., 'White Mythology', pp. 224 and 228-9. 
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